At Tor Top and Mount Sorrel in the Somme he learns how to coordinate advancing infantry with artillery firepower and how to organize his brigades into stronger fighting formations. He learns too that not only must you take the enemy front trench but you must control the enemy’s approaches to it.
In Jan 1917 he writes a tactical analysis of the French actions during the Verdun battles. This would become future doctrine for the Canadian Corps.
Besides using the artillery for laying down fire on trenches, he uses it to lay smoke, disrupt the enemy’s rear supply lines and suggests changes to the scheduling to make it unpredictable. He states “Our troops must be taught the power of maneuver.” He subscribes to the French use of platoons, rather than the British method of attacking in waves. He emphasizes the use of engineers to ensure battlefield mobility and use of accurate maps and intelligence right down to the NCO level. Moreover he makes a point of saying that natural features, not trench lines, should be the objectives of attack. Finally you should not attack unless you have a reasonable assurance of success.